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Abstract
This article draws from John Dewey’s philosophy of education, ideas about democracy and pragmatist assumptions to ex-
plain how his articles for The New Republic functioned pedagogically. Taking media as a mode of public pedagogy, and
drawing extensively from Dewey’s Democracy and Education, as well as from his book The Public and its Problems, the
article explores the relationships between communication, education and democracy using the expanded conceptions
of all the aforementioned advanced by Dewey. Borrowing insights from Randolph Bourne, who used Dewey’s own ideas
to criticize his mentor’s influence on intellectuals who supported US involvement in World War I, the analysis explores
the contradictions within Dewey’s public pedagogy. The article suggests Dewey’s relevance as a public intellectual in the
liberal-progressive press, his view of the State and some of his related presuppositions produced a tension in his thought,
delimiting democratic possibilities while simultaneously pointing toward greater democratic potentials. The essay con-
cludes by suggesting that learning from both Dewey and Bourne prompts us to get beyond the former’s public/private
dualism to realize what he called the “Great Community” by communicating and practicing the Commons.
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1. Introduction
The same year The New Republic (hereafter, TNR) pub-
lished its first issue, John Dewey penned his first of many
contributions for the weekly magazine. Dewey, the prag-
matist philosopher perhaps best known for his philoso-
phy of education, would go on to write well over 50 arti-
cles for TNR. To examine Dewey’s role as a public intellec-
tual, played out in the pages of TNR, this analysis borrows
the notion of “public pedagogy”, popularized in the last
two decades by Henry Giroux (Sandlin, O’Malley, & Bur-
dick, 2011, p. 341). Public pedagogy is used here as a con-
cept for understanding mediated culture as a site (or as
sites) of informal, often under-acknowledged education
(Giroux, 2004, 2008). A public pedagogy lens brings into
focus how desires are mobilized and moral values are
shaped (Giroux, 2000, p. 349). Public pedagogy serves
here as a concept for critiquing forms of education oc-
curring in and throughmediated culture. Below I use the
concept to critically understand Dewey’s relevant work,
found in TNR archive. Using ideas from Dewey’s philo-
sophical work—and drawing especially from Democracy
and Education and The Public and its Problems—I ex-
amine how and why Dewey’s contributions to TNR func-
tioned pedagogically. I try to sketch the contours of the
bounds within which Dewey’s public pedagogy operated
andwhich it helped reconstruct. To do so I relate Dewey’s
ideas to those of Randolph Bourne, who was mentored
by Dewey at Columbia University and who worked as an
editor for TNR for a time before becoming a prolific critic
of his colleagues’ support for World War I.
I hope to show howDewey’s relevance was in part re-
lated to his role as an influential thinker as well as to how
he understood and communicated the role of the pub-
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lic in relation to education, democracy, community and
especially the state. Dewey was not content to offer in-
terpretations of the world; he applied his interpretations
to problems and when possible tried to influence out-
comes (Tiles, 1992, p. 2). Given that his written word had
such influence, understanding the public pedagogy he
propounded in the pages of a prominent journal of pop-
ular progressive opinion assumes added importance. No-
tably, Dewey also conceived of the public and the state
as necessarily linked—he roughly conflated “the state”
with “the public” (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 21) in his major
work on the subjects—and that conceptual knot appears
to have produced a tension in his public pedagogy. Writ-
ers have posited Dewey’s philosophy as commensurate
with a social anarchism critical of arbitrarily justified au-
thority and concentrated power, wielded by the state or
otherwise (Chomsky, 2013, pp. 692–693;Mancias, 1982).
What has not been explored is how Dewey’s contribu-
tions to TNR reveal a pragmatism and idea of democracy
fraught with potential for progress but bounded by his
role as a public intellectual and by his related understand-
ing of the state.
2. Divergent Philosophies and Differing Ideas of
Democracy
Dewey’s influence among educators became so strong
within his lifetime that it prompted the formation of a
society in his name (Tanner, 2015), while he was still con-
tributing to TNR. His idea of education emphasized culti-
vation of a common understanding of means and ends
necessary for intelligent control of the world we help
comprise (Dewey, 1916/1997). As opposed to external
control over others, education in this vein involves the
freeing of individual capacities for flourishing directed to-
ward social aims. Education in a democratic society im-
plies providing “individuals a personal interest in social
relationships and control” (p. 99) so that people can be
active agents determining the direction of social change.
Dewey’s idea of education was intimately bound up with
his idea of democracy. “Since a democratic society re-
pudiates the principle of external authority”, he wrote,
“it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and
interest; these can be created only by education” (p.
87). Moreover, “democracy is more than a form of gov-
ernment; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of
conjoint communicated experience” (p. 87). Writing a
decade later, Dewey (1927/1954) referred to democracy
as “the idea of community life itself” (p. 148). It is “clear
consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications”,
which “constitutes the idea of democracy” (p. 149).
Upon first inspection, Dewey’s ideas stand in con-
trast to what one of his famous contemporaries wrote
about democracy. Walter Lippmann, who was recruited
by TNR’s first editor-in-chief, Herbert Croly, to start as
an editor at the magazine upon its inauguration, was
comparatively sceptical about a democratic public. Oth-
ers have highlighted the Dewey–Lippmann “debate” and
emphasized its implications for the understanding of me-
dia and democracy (Crick, 2009; DeCesare, 2016; Dol-
ber, 2017). Lippmann (1922/1997) believed news me-
dia are incapable of offering the truth to the public, in-
sofar as that would entail bringing to light concealed
facts, relating them and providing a picture of reality for
people to use to act and participate in self-government
(pp. 214–232). Lippmann’s (1927/2017) “thesis”was that
those constituting the public must remain “spectators
of action” (p. 93), tasked merely with determining “the
actor in a controversy who is most worthy of public
support” (p. 120). Knowledgeable experts are needed,
he thought, to manage people’s affairs for them. Pub-
lic constituents are a trampling “bewildered herd” (p.
2), and the herd “must be put in its place”, Lippmann
(1927/2017) claimed. But Dewey (1927/1954), it is worth
noting, also considered the existing public to be “be-
wildered” (p. 123), “inchoate” (p. 147), “confused and
eclipsed” (p. 121). A tension within Dewey’s philosophy,
unpacked below, drew him closer to Lippmann in certain
respects, even as they strongly diverged.
Dewey was arguably more concerned than his TNR
colleague with how the public could “function demo-
cratically” (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 147) and better rec-
ognize and communicate people’s shared consequences.
Dewey was an early proponent of what is sometimes
called “public journalism”—reporting rooted in active
civic involvement and committed to clearly communi-
cating issues of social consequence (Perry, 2003). For
the extant public to emerge out of eclipse required
searching for (or creating) new “conditions”, as Dewey
put it, the characteristics of which bear striking resem-
blance to his ideas of education. An individual ought to
have “a responsible share according to capacity in form-
ing and directing the activities of the groups to which
one belongs and in participating according to need in
the values which the groups sustain”; creating condi-
tions conducive to a democratic public implied “libera-
tion of the potentialities of members of a group in har-
mony with the interest and goods which are common”
(Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 147).
For Dewey, democracy could only be realized
through education enabling individuals to play a role in
consciously constituting collective life, and for that to oc-
cur education must be community based (Višňovský &
Zolcer, 2016, p. 58). Dewey understood democracy as
a personal way of life and as a commitment to a com-
munity, to a social organization which helps individuals
develop the capacity, and practice the ability, to criti-
cize popular notions of what is right and good (Putnam,
2009). He envisioned democratic practice as providing
the education necessary for the emergence of the “Great
Community” (Dewey, 1927/1954), a consociation of self-
organized individuals conscious of and each participating
in decisions and actions shaping the consequences of the
social life which in turn shapes them. Social psychologist
Graham Wallas (1914) introduced a similar notion—the
“Great Society”—the year TNR first hit the press, empha-
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sizing the greater nexus of connectivity created by indus-
trialization and the expanded limits to communication
characterizing a new social environment. Two years later,
idealist philosopher Josiah Royce—who had three years
earlier coined the related phrase, the “Beloved Commu-
nity” (Royce, 1913/2001)—also popularized the notion
of the “Great Community” in a book containing a title
with the term (Royce, 1916), published the same year
as Dewey’s Democracy and Education. Both Royce and
(later) Dewey took the “Great Community” as the ideal
of a bonded humanity, but Dewey placed greater faith in
the role of experimental inquiry and scientific advance as
guiding its realization (Oppenheim, 2005). Pappas (2008)
argued Dewey took the “Great Community” and democ-
racy both as ideals and simultaneously as ethical instru-
ments for negotiating the tensions and extremes located
within our social experience; he took them as tools to
tackle public problems to be assessed on the basis by
which they enrich—and successfully address the prob-
lems of—present experience (pp. 217–259). As Bishop
(2010) observed, Dewey believed the evolution of this
“Great Community” required (among other conditions)
freedom of inquiry and unrestricted production and
dissemination of knowledge; member participation in
achievements and struggles; cooperation among groups;
and maintenance of shared means of communication
(pp. 107–114). Notably, for Dewey, negative freedom of
communication (i.e. freedom of the press from govern-
ment censorship) was not enough (Pappas, 2008, p. 222).
Democratic communication, for Dewey, necessarily en-
tails education, understood broadly to include the teach-
ing and learning taking place through culture. Dewey did
not discuss in detail the number of individuals or the level
of wealth necessary for a “Great Community” to thrive
(Bishop, 2010, p. 114), although he was aware of the lim-
its imposed by distance and scale, even if he never dis-
cussed how far we ought to extend our sense of self and
the communal (Pappas, 2008, p. 229). Neither Deweynor
students of his philosophy interrogated fully, though, the
limitations and obstacles inbuilt in the way humans have
organized that extension, as with instruments like the
nation-state. Also absent in the literature is a critique of
the tensions within Dewey’s role as a public intellectual,
via his extensive TNR oeuvre, vis-à-vis his views on the
relationships between values, democracy and the state.
While there are early histories of TNR, some of which
evaluate how values are shapedwithin themagazine and
even some which highlight the magazine’s relationship
to education and Dewey’s contributions (Nuechterlein,
1980; Peterson, 1999; Turner, 1983), little work has fo-
cused specifically on a constructive critique of Dewey’s
public pedagogy operating in TNR. What follows is an at-
tempt to begin filling in those gaps.
3. Education and/for Democracy in TNR
At least 10 of the articles Dewey penned for TNR from the
time themagazinewas first established, in 1914, through
1916, the year Democracy and Education was published,
were explicitly about education. Some of Dewey’s contri-
butions came in the form of a dialogue, insofar as that
mode of education is possible through the press. In a
reply to one critic, he argued against the kind of voca-
tional education “which will ‘adapt’ workers to the exist-
ing industrial regime”—wryly remarking, “I am not suffi-
ciently in love with the regime for that”—and he called
instead for education “which would have as its supreme
regard the development of such intelligent initiative, in-
genuity and executive capacity as shall make workers,
as far as may be, the masters of their own industrial
fate” (Dewey, 1915a, p. 42). Those interested in practical
education could “strive for a kind vocational education
which will first alter the existing industrial system, and ul-
timately transform it” (p. 42). He warned of educational
reforms which would rigidify the class system (Dewey,
1915b, p. 238). After a National Education Association
meeting on education and culture, Dewey (1916a) de-
fended the NEA aims of transmuting “a society built on
an industry which is not yet humanized into a society
whichwields its knowledge and its industrial power in be-
half of a democratic culture”—endeavors requiring “the
courage of an inspired imagination” (p. 215). He claimed
“the only test and justification of any formof political and
economic society is its contribution to art and science—
to what may roundly be called culture. That America has
not yet so justified itself is too obvious for even lament”
(p. 216). Dewey’s contributions connect public education
to a formative culture and the relationship of both to an
expansive practice of democracy, extended into the eco-
nomic sphere, but also as part of the production of new
political-community and aesthetic life.
Dewey also applauded experiments in education fo-
cused on the experimental method. Concordant with
his later philosophical work (e.g. Dewey, 1930/2013,
pp. 284, 260, 1939/1991, pp. 51, 66), in TNR he called the
scientific method “the spirit in which a social problem
is to be approached” (Dewey, 1917a, p. 16). The public
should, he suggested, become familiar with a method of
education emphasizing experiment and discovery (p. 16).
In one of many book reviews he wrote for TNR, Dewey
(1918a) applauded Helen Marot, author of Creative Im-
pulse in Industry, for stressing, as he put it, “the impor-
tance of such conditions and methods as will give each
student-worker personal experience in the administra-
tive control of the processes of production and market-
ing” (p. 23). Not only did he connect education to eco-
nomic democracy in his articles. He also related those
processes to the experimental method as a tool for un-
derstanding and mediating social consequences.
Expounding upon claimsmade by the American Asso-
ciation of University Professors, which he helped found,
Dewey (1916b) claimed the “real question of academic
freedom” had to dowith the liberty of educators and stu-
dents to engage in “serious thought on social difficulties
and conflicts” (p. 16). Some two decades later, when he
announced the formation of a committee to raise funds
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for a professor who staged a hunger strike to protest per-
secution of students at Polish universities and was subse-
quently fired from the City College of New York (Dewey,
1937a), he underscored for TNR readers that democratic
freedoms imply education beyond academe.
4. Lessons and Contradictions Regarding Democracy
and the State
The assumptions required for entrance into the range of
debate in the progressive press appear to havemade the
breadth of Dewey’s public pedagogy possible while si-
multaneously shipwrecking it on the shoals of the liberal-
democratic state. Despite chiding others for generaliza-
tions, Dewey (1927/1954) suggested, sans historical evi-
dence, that once “indirect consequences are recognized
and there is effort to regulate them, something having
the traits of a state come into existence” (p. 12). When
people “indirectly affected” by consequences of inter-
connected human activity “formed a public”, Dewey pre-
supposes, this presented “in embryonic form the traits
that define a state, its agencies and officers” (p. 17).
He cautioned against this “notion of ‘The State’”, which
can draw “us imperceptibly into consideration of the
logical relationship of various ideas to one another,
and away from facts of human activity” (pp. 8–9). He
warned against focusing on “causal agency instead of
consequences” (p. 20) in an investigation of the state’s
emergence. Yet he drew conclusions from select conse-
quences without sufficient focus on how people acted
in relation to others to bring states into existence histor-
ically. Once people recognized “evil consequences”, he
abstractly avers, they then arrived at a “common inter-
est” which they all decided, readers are told, required
rules and thus selection of “guardians, interpreters, and,
if need be, their executors” (p. 17).
Those under-examined presuppositions undergirded
his understanding of the public and its potential. The
tensions and tendencies played out in his TNR contribu-
tions. In an article about force, violence and law, Dewey
(1916c) criticized those opposing the state and the use
of police force, claiming that being “interested in ends
and to have contempt for the means which alone se-
cure them is the last stage of intellectual demoralization”
(p. 296). The claim rests upon an untested assumption
about what “alone secure” ends he presumed others de-
sire. The assumption excludes alternative ideas about
both means and ends, educating readers within the
liberal-progressive frame. Dewey further criticized the
peace movement—admonishing its “hostility to force”
(p. 296) and reproaching pacifists for their failure to fo-
cus on organizing existing forces for more desirable and
efficient ends. He rebuked peace activists for appealing
to emotionswithout advocating for laws—or, perhaps for
not also advocating for different social arrangements, al-
though Dewey is somewhat ambiguous on that in the
piece. Although he unpacked the appeal to ends as re-
ferring to actual results, not simply aspirations (p. 296),
he placed the onus of responsibility not on those sup-
porting militarized force pitting armies of states against
each other, but instead on those opposing specific (not
just any and all) uses of “force”, a euphemism referring
to the state-sponsored bullets and bombs already rip-
ping open and burning human flesh throughout the Eu-
ropean theatre.
The above bears resemblance to other commen-
taries Dewey authored for Croly’s magazine which were
later rebuked by the youngwriter Dewey oncementored.
Randolph Bourne, who like Lippmannwas one of the first
recruited by Croly to join TNR, broke with the journal be-
cause of the publication’s embrace ofWoodrowWilson’s
about-face away from neutrality toward intervention in
World War I (Dos Passos, 1993/2000, p. 80; Westbrook,
2007, p. 105). The sentiment appears to have been mu-
tual at the time, as “prowar progressives at TNR wanted
nothing to do with him, of course” (Blake, 2014, p. 86).
Yet in earlier writing for TNR, Bourne (1915) com-
mented favorably on Dewey’s philosophy and charac-
ter. He credited Dewey “with some of the wisest words
ever set to paper”, referred to Dewey’s mind as “ultra-
democratic”, and called him “a prophet dressed in the
clothes of a professor of logic” who “seems almost
ashamed that he has seen the implications of democracy
more clearly than anybody else in the great would-be
democratic society about him, and so [has] been forced
into the unwelcome task of teaching it” (p. 154). Bourne
claimed that no one else “with such universally impor-
tant things to say on almost every social and intellectual
activity of the day, was ever published in forms more in-
geniously contrived to thwart the interest of the prospec-
tive public” (p. 154).
Within two years Bourne would be critiquing Dewey,
and his influence on progressive intellectuals, in The
Seven Arts, a small and short-lived literary magazine. On
Dewey’s pragmatism-turned-realpolitik, Bourne (1917a)
saw someone incredulously “more concerned over the
excesses of the pacifists than over the excesses of
military policy” (p. 689). Under-examined assumptions
about using means at odds with democracy to achieve
democratic results led Bourne (1917a) “to suspect that
no programme is presented” by intellectuals under
Dewey’s sway—while lack of a pacifist program is chas-
tised in TNR—“because they have none to present. This
burrowing into war-technique hides the void where a
democratic philosophy should be” (p. 694). Of special
concern “is the relative ease with which the pragmatist
intellectuals, with Professor Dewey at the head, have
moved out their philosophy, bag and baggage, from ed-
ucation to war” (p. 692). Rather, Dewey and TNR turned,
pragmatically the weekly commentaries implied, to a
pedagogy of and for war. Bourne (1917b) satirized the
sentiments expressed by TNR intellectuals: “War in the
interests of democracy! This was almost the sum of their
philosophy” (p. 142).
Dewey (1917b) elsewhere cautioned against efforts
to silence anti-war activists, arguing that censorship and
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repression aimed at imposing uniformity of thought—a
“conscription ofmind” (p. 129)—only fuel the flames. But
in so doing he chided “the spectacle of ultra-socialists”
and took issue with the “inefficacy of the conscription of
mind as a means of promoting social solidarity” (p. 129),
the sort of solidarity he called necessary “in war times”
(p. 128). In another piece he distinguished the paci-
fistic American people from the “professional pacifists”
(Dewey, 1917c, p. 358). He dismissed pacifist literature
leading up to the war as “opportunistic—breathlessly,
frantically so”, deriding “the failure of the pacifist propa-
ganda to determine finally the course of a nation which
was converted to pacifism in advance”, and lamenting
“that the pacifists wasted rather than invested their po-
tentialities when they turned so vigorously to opposing
entrance into a war which was already all but univer-
sal” (p. 359).
Bourne offered two indirect rejoinders to that asser-
tion, using parts of Dewey’s own philosophy as tools for
critique. If we had practiced Dewey’s “revolutionary con-
ceptions of what education means”, as well as his “in-
tellectual strategy” for such an education, the nation
might have used its isolation to educate itself for democ-
racy instead of engaging in war, which inevitably under-
mines democratic values (Bourne, 1917a, pp. 691, 698).
And would Dewey’s progeny “have turned their intellec-
tual energies not to the problem of jockeying the na-
tion into war, but to the problem of using our vast neu-
tral power to attain democratic ends for ourselves and
the rest of the world”, avoiding militarism irreconcilable
with democracy (in the sense Dewey once understood
the idea, as ultimately incommensurate with the State),
“They might have failed. The point is that they scarcely
tried” (Bourne, 1917b, p. 136).
Known for making his mark between extremes (Hick-
man, 1990, p. 179), Dewey brought that tendency into
the pages of TNR, pitting severe repression against anti-
war socialism (and pacifistic Americans against peace
activists) as opposing poles both deserving censure.
But that liberal-progressive proclivity—occupying a sup-
posed socio-political middle ground—like the emphasis
on journalistic objectivity that arose with the advent of
commercially-controlled media during Dewey’s day, can
result in false equivalencies and normalize arrangements
which otherwise might be criticized as “extreme” were
other criteria used to make the determination.
Echoing (or influencing) the ideas of TNR’s editor-in-
chief Croly, who deemed US involvement in World War I
a “rare opportunity”, and a new “chance to focus the
thought & will of the country” (as cited in Levy, 2014,
p. 249), Dewey told readers thatwar “mustmake” a “con-
tribution” “to the creation of a united America” (Dewey,
1917b, p. 130). He presupposed the benevolence of US
state policy objectives when he lamented in TNR “that
some of our intolerance at diversity of opinion and our
willingness to suppress civil liberties of democracy in the
name of loyalty to democracy is merely a part of our
haste to get into the war effectively, a part of the rush of
mobilization, which, thank heaven, had to be improvised
because of our historic and established unmilitarism”
(Dewey, 1917d, p. 18). He also referred to those in the
US as “more highly socialized” (Dewey, 1918b, p. 232).
His American exceptionalism as a mode of public ped-
agogy failed to teach about the history of international
US military intervention and deployment of the military
for domestic control. Echoing the American instrumen-
talism he popularized, the author called criticizing “the
wickedness of war” and indulging “in asseverations of
the obligations of states to act upon the basis of themost
enlightened code” a “Pharisaic luxury”, unless the crit-
ics would “fight for the establishment of a social orga-
nization which will make moral responsibilities and regu-
lations a fact” (pp. 232–233). Dewey thereby dismissed
vocal anti-war criticism (ignoring themobilization that of-
ten accompanied it), excluding any consideration that or-
ganizing against international war could be part of that
struggle for amoremoral social organization. But he also
levelled a tacit criticism regarding the morally question-
able function of nation-states, implying states are at odds
with forms of social organization in which real demo-
cratic sensibilities could be part and parcel.
In light of the support for war at TNR, the “philoso-
phy upon which I had relied to carry us through”, Bourne
(1917a) lamented, “no longer works” (p. 690)—a wryly
ironic condemnation of the popular Deweyan pragma-
tism, given its concern for what is functional. Presum-
ably less than pleased with the criticism, Dewey surrepti-
tiously forced Bourne off the editorial board of the Dial,
another alternative weekly where he had been working
(Blake, 2014, p. 86; Phelps, 1998, para. 3). While Dewey
might not have fully grasped the lesson from the man
he mentored at Columbia—the man who wrote “War is
the health of the state” (Bourne, 1918/1998, p. 9) in an
unfinishedmanuscript published soon after he died of in-
fluenza at 32—Dewey would later regret his full-fledged
support for World War I, and TNR editors would go on
to print a formalmea culpa regarding their support for it
(Bennett & Howlett, 2014, p. 29; Levy, 2014, p. 266).
5. Conclusions and Consequences: Communicating the
Commons
Examination of the consequences of Dewey’s insights
and contradictions reveals some of the shortcomings in
his public pedagogy, but perhaps that pedagogy provides
lessons to be learned regarding how to act going forward.
Central to Dewey’s pedagogical project was the trans-
lation of philosophy into the language of the broader
public. He tried to make the philosophies of Charles S.
Peirce and George H. Meade accessible to those outside
his discipline through TNR (Dewey, 1936, 1937b). Like-
wise, he wrote an article in TNR about the need for a
new individualism years before his book on the subject
(Dewey, 1930/1999) came out, arguing democracy “de-
notes faith in individuality” and a “willing acceptance of
the modifications of the established order entailed by
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the release of individualized capacities” (Dewey, 1922,
p. 62). “Democracy will not be democracy until educa-
tion”, he added, promotes “release of distinctive apti-
tudes” (p. 63) of individuals across a variety of spheres.
In hiswork on the public, Dewey (1927/1954) posited
that it is “only by distribution” that experimentally at-
tained knowledge could “be either obtained or tested”
(pp. 176–177). He went so far to refer to any “fact of
community life” which isn’t communicated so as to be-
come a “common possession” a “contradiction in terms”
(p. 177). He even equated the “formation of public opin-
ion” with such mediated communication (p. 177). Func-
tioning public opinion implies both “methods of investi-
gation and reporting constantly atwork” (p. 178). Indeed,
while “news” denotes what just occurred in a way that
contrasts withwhatwas, individuals cannot derivemean-
ing from it unless its mediation facilitates a consideration
of possible “social consequences”, which cannot be seri-
ously considered “unless the new is placed in relation to
the old, to what has happened and [has] been integrated
into the course of events” (p. 180). Otherwise, sensa-
tionalism ensues. The sensation of the new becomes
the reigning objective for journalism given how events
are “so completely isolated from their connections” (p.
180). The sensationalist prerogative of the press had be-
come so hegemonic “that it may well sound ridiculous
to say that”, as Dewey had it, “a genuine social science
wouldmanifest its reality in the daily press” (p. 180), with
scholarly articles and books providing tools for inquiry.
Dewey’s ethics held science and morals to be reconcil-
able (Welchman, 1995), and there is reason to believe
Dewey would have wanted his TNR contributions to be a
mode of scientific public pedagogy.
His rejection of the dualism between theory and ac-
tion reveals itself in TNR as intrinsically tied to both his
ideas about education and democratic control, which ap-
pear inextricable from his emphasis (epitomizing an im-
portant tension) on experimentation as crucial for knowl-
edge and progress in a variety of human domains. Af-
ter the US had entered World War I, Dewey (1918b)
referred to the belief that international law expressed
“not true but only moral law” as a “striking indication
of the widespread absence of scientific understanding
of morals” (p. 232), reaffirming his commitment to sci-
entific explication of values and his belief in a bonded
humanity, albeit one premised upon interlocking nation-
states. “States”, he claimed “are non-moral in their activ-
ities just because of the absence of an inclusive society
which defines and establishes rights” (p. 232), thereby
underscoring a contradictory assumption: States are in-
sufficient when it comes to creating a moral order, but
at least here Dewey assumes that they can be compat-
ible with and do not militate against the morality of a
Great Community. The untested assumption contributes
to a public pedagogy overlooking ideas about experi-
menting with alternative institutions which could prove
more supportive of such a community than the politi-
cal state. Later, during the Depression, Dewey (1934) re-
minded TNR readers of his position that “no genuine ed-
ucation is possible without active participation in actual
conditions”, pointing out again “that economic interests
are the chief cause why this change in education is re-
tarded and reflected” (p. 307). The great achievement
of the physical sciences is that they showed action—
“namely, action that changes conditions that previously
existed” (p. 307)—to be a necessary aspect of intelli-
gence. Dewey (1930a) claimed the experimental attitude
prompted adherence to “new truth” discovered, that sci-
ence was “the foe of every belief that permits habit and
wont to dominate”, and that it would be “dangerous only
for thosewhowouldmaintain affairs in the existing social
order unchanged because of lazy habit or self-interest”
(p. 185). Responding to Nietzsche’s notion that human
beings now must create their own values, he told TNR
readers when we start taking “science (including its ap-
plication to the machine) for what it is”, then “we shall
begin to envisage it as a potential creator of new values
and ends” (p. 186).
Yet Nietzsche (1918/2010) also understood the con-
ditions prompting the “transvaluation of all values”
(p. 149)—conditions arising from the ascendance of sci-
ence and eclipse of religion—could have “catastrophic
consequences”, as one of Nietzsche’s posthumous ed-
itors put it (Williams, 2001, p. xiii). Not for nothing,
then, did Bourne (1917a) label his print media critique
of Dewey Twilight of Idols, a title akin to Nietzsche’s
(1889/1997) Twilight of the Idols, save for the omitted ar-
ticle. Tellingly, Bourne cites Nietzsche approvingly in the
final paragraph of his Seven Arts piece. Moreover, he re-
marked that progressive intellectuals in the wake of war
“failed us as value-creators, even as value-emphasizers”
(1917a, p. 700).
To be sure, the appeal and promise of Dewey’s phi-
losophy lies in part with his argument against accep-
tance of what exists based upon untested convention
as well as the implications for understanding knowledge
as tethered to intelligent action in the world. Yet ques-
tions remain. How are values to be tested (aside from
perhaps democratically, insofar as that’s possible)? How
are tested values to be judged? What precepts, insights
andmeans ought to be used in arriving at experimentally
determined value judgments? How is the existing good—
the material for guidance and hope, Dewey suggests—
to be identified as such? The problem announces itself
in the last line from that same TNR article. In “accept-
ing the corporate and industrial world in which we live,
and thus by fulfilling the precondition for interaction
with it, we”, Dewey (1930a) avers, “who are also parts
of the moving present, create ourselves as we create
an unknown future” (p. 188). Why “accepting the corpo-
rate and industrial world” is a prerequisite for a proper
remaking of the individual—and why the state should
be presumed amenable for truly democratic community
life—when other hitherto facts and habits are identified
as outmoded—remains unclear. As Bourne (1917a) ob-
served, “there was always that unhappy ambiguity in his
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doctrine as to just how values were created, and it be-
came easier and easier to assume that just any growth
was justified and almost any activity valuable so long as
it achieved ends” (p. 697).
Tension and ambiguity notwithstanding, Dewey edu-
cated the TNR public, in ways hard to dismiss. Pitting the
individual and social in opposition “distracts attention”,
he explained, from the crucial question of how the indi-
vidual can “refind” himself “and what qualities the new
individualism will exhibit” (Dewey, 1930b, p. 14). The in-
sight parallels his previous call for the necessary restora-
tion of “local communal life” lest the public be unable
to “resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify
itself” (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 216).
According to Hickman (1990), throughout his work
Dewey demonstrated the “individual versus society”
dilemma ceases to be an issue because there is “a prob-
lem of reconciling the extremes only if one has made the
mistake of separating them in the first place” (p. 169). If
you avoid taking the individual as a concept abstracted
out from lived consociation with others—preconditions
for actual human individuality—the dualism dissolves
and the objective of greater freedom from the restric-
tions of nature and society is converted into the more
productive desire for greater intimate relations with the
world allowing for heightened capacity to understand
and transform it (Hickman, 1990, p. 171).
Dewey, however, also advanced a dualism of his own.
Dewey had no ontology of the state (Hickman, 1990,
p. 172); he had none, though, because as suggested,
he naturalized the state as an emergent property of
the consequences of conjoint action extending beyond
those persons directly responsible (Dewey, 1927/1954,
pp. 24–27). The omission informed his qualified accep-
tance of the state as a tool for a democratic public. He ex-
plicitly stated his “thesis”: that in the distinction between
public and private “we find the key to the nature and of-
fice of the state” (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 15). Therein lies
the rub. In Hickman’s (1990) words, “what is private and
what is public are treated by Dewey as tools that may be
brought to bear on problematic situations in ways that
‘individual’ and ‘society’, because of the ontological bag-
gage they carry, cannot” (p. 170). For, Dewey, though,
the notions of public and private are more than “func-
tional concepts” (p. 170), as Hickman (1990) would have
it. They are keys “to the nature and office of the state”, if
also “tools” for reconstructing the state. The characteris-
tics, limitations and range of possible functions of tools
make themuseful for particular tasks and counterproduc-
tive when used for others. “Dewey is unequivocal in his
view that the state is a technological artifact” (Hickman,
1990, p. 173), a constructed and specific tool. It admit-
tedly assumes various forms and functions from one soci-
ety and epoch to the next, but it indisputably has certain
defining characteristics (e.g. division between the public
and private) which permit us to refer to the State. Yet
even as he acceded to a state-centric framework, Dewey
(1927/1954) also referred to the “idea of democracy” as
“a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the
state even at its best” (p. 143). Perhaps better tools than
the state exist for practicing democracy and for creating
the conditions needed for a Great Community to emerge.
Dewey (1916/1997) famously related the revelation
and comprehension of previously unacknowledged con-
nections to education and the communication of knowl-
edge. To study and learn from Dewey prompts us then
to follow Bourne and take the democratic idea of the
Great Community further. “Bourne was the first Ameri-
can to”—40 years before Martin Luther King Jr.—borrow
the “Beloved Community” ideal “from the work of the
philosopher Josiah Royce and hold it up as the ulti-
mate fulfilment of our national project” (McCarter, 2017,
para. 8). One lesson to be learned from both could be
the pragmatic overcoming of the private/public distinc-
tion. That dualism could be displaced by the “commons”,
what Linebaugh (2009) calls “the theory”—and,we could
add, informed action—“that vests all property in the
community and organizes labor for the common bene-
fit of all” (p. 8). A precondition for such a community,
then, involves communicating the commons so that in-
dividuals can consociate without coercion and together
seek to better understand and control the consequences
of their mediated social existence. The commons could
then begin to displace technological artifacts, like the
state, which unnecessarily encourage individuals to ex-
ercise control over each other. Future research could un-
ravel the lessons, found in the public pedagogies of both
Bourne and Dewey taken together, for translating such a
democratic experiment into action.
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